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Abstract: We use the introduction of exchange-traded weather derivative contracts as a natural 
experiment to examine the relation between risk and incentives. In particular, we examine how 
executives’ ability to hedge uncontrollable weather-related risk that was previously difficult and 
costly to manage influences the design of executives’ incentive-compensation contracts. We also 
examine the whether the ability to hedge this important source of uncontrollable risk affects 
executives’ subsequent risk-taking. We find that the CEOs of firms that are relatively more 
exposed to uncontrollable weather risk—and therefore stand to benefit the most from hedging 
this source of risk—receive less annual compensation and have fewer equity incentives 
following the introduction of weather derivatives. We attribute the decline in annual 
compensation to a reduction in the risk premium that CEOs demand for exposure to 
uncontrollable risk. We attribute the decline in equity incentives to stock price becoming a more 
precise measure of CEOs’ actions—and therefore a more informative performance measure—so 
that fewer shares of stock and stock options are required to provide the same total incentives. 
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1. Introduction 
 We use the introduction of exchange-traded weather derivative contracts as a natural 
experiment that allows us to examine the relation between corporate risk and executives’ 
incentive-compensation contracts. Exchange-traded weather derivatives allow the executives of 
firms that are exposed to weather-related events to more efficiently hedge this important source 
of uncontrollable risk. Consequently, the introduction of weather derivatives should influence 
both the design of executives’ incentive-compensation contracts and their subsequent risk-taking 
decisions. We focus on firms in the utility industry, which tend to have a relatively large 
exposure to uncontrollable weather risk, and therefore provide a powerful setting in which to 
examine the relation between risk and incentives.1 Prior to the introduction of exchange-traded 
weather derivatives, it was difficult (i.e., costly, if at all feasible) for these firms to hedge the risk 
associated with their exposure to the weather. Exchange-traded weather derivative contracts 
allow these firms to hedge—or, at a minimum, hedge more efficiently—uncontrollable weather-
related outcomes. Accordingly, the introduction of weather derivatives provides a powerful 
research setting to examine how risk affects the design of executives’ incentive-compensation 
contracts and the incentives provided by these contracts. 
Our study is premised on the widely-accepted notion that risk averse executives who are 
undiversified by virtue of their relatively large firm-specific equity holdings are potentially 
exposed to a variety of uncontrollable risks that can give rise to agency problems. Risk that is 
uncontrollable from an executive’s perspective includes both systematic risk that is “priced” in 
the form of a discount that is applied to the firm’s expected cash flows, and idiosyncratic risk 
                                                 
1 In the following sections, we discuss in more detail the important distinction between executives’ choice of their 
firm’s exposure to weather-related events—which is at least somewhat controllable—and the realization of a 
particular weather-related outcome—which is uncontrollable. We also discuss the important notion of 
“controllability.” Briefly, a particular outcome, or performance measure is “controllable” if an executive’s “actions 
influence the probability distribution of that variable” (Lambert, 2001, 23). 
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that is not priced. To the extent that an executive’s payoff is tied to an outcome (e.g., stock price) 
that is affected by uncontrollable risk of either type, it exposes the executive to uncontrollable 
“noise,” which can have a number of adverse effects.  
 To the extent that these derivatives allow managers to more efficiently and effectively 
hedge a relatively important source of firm risk that is uncontrollable, they should, in turn, affect 
managers’ incentive-compensation contracts in several important ways. First, the ability to hedge 
uncontrollable risk should affect the level (i.e., amount) of executives’ annual pay. Core and 
Guay (2010) discuss how a portion of an executive’s annual pay consists of a risk-premium to 
compensate the executive for bearing the risk associated with his performance-based incentives. 
If hedging allows executives to eliminate some of this risk, they should demand (and receive) a 
lower risk-premium in their annual pay. Second, the ability to hedge uncontrollable risk should 
also affect executives’ incentives in general, and their equity incentives in particular. However 
unlike its effect on annual pay, the effect of hedging on executives’ incentives is theoretically 
ambiguous. On one hand, decreasing the effect of weather risk on stock price reduces an 
executive’s exposure to uncontrollable “noise” for each unit of incentives (e.g., delta). Since 
each unit of incentives now has less “per-unit risk,” boards can provide CEOs with more 
incentives while maintaining the same level of risk. We refer to this effect as the incentive 
benefit hypothesis. On the other hand, since each unity of incentives (e.g., delta) is now a more 
precise measure of the executive’s controllable actions, fewer “units” of incentives (i.e., less 
delta) is required to provide the same total incentives.2 We refer to this effect as the costly risk 
hypothesis.  
                                                 
2 In other words, stock price becomes a more informative performance measure after some of the uncontrollable 
noise is removed. 
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 Prior studies that examine how hedging impacts the design of executives’ incentive-
compensation contracts and influences their risk-taking decisions can be broadly classified into 
two groups according to whether they focus on executives’ personal hedging decisions (i.e., 
decisions regarding their personal equity holdings) or their corporate hedging decisions. Papers 
in the first group that focus on executives’ hedging decisions related to their personal equity 
holdings can be viewed as examining the mechanisms that managers use to alter the level and 
composition of their exposure to their firm’s risk. However, this is expected to be a second-order 
effect, since firms severely restrict managers’ ability to directly hedge idiosyncratic risk through 
financial transactions. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the incidence of hedging firm-
specific risk among managers is relatively low. For example, Jagolinzer, Matsunaga, and Yeung 
(2007) find only 203 prepaid variable forward (PVF) transactions, which allow insiders to hedge 
firm-specific risk, that were initiated by insiders during their sample period that spans nearly a 
decade. Similarly, Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001) find only 87 zero-cost collar transactions 
and two equity-swap transactions by insiders at 65 firms between 1996 and 1998. Finally, Bettis, 
Coles, and Lemmon (2000) find that a majority of the firms in their sample have policies that 
restrict insider trading. 
Papers in the second group that focus on executives’ corporate hedging decisions 
examine their firm-level decisions, which have an indirect effect on their equity portfolios.3 
Studies in this literature include Guay (1999), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Coles et al. (2006), 
                                                 
3 One way to formulate the distinction between the two sets of studies is to consider the celebrated Miller and 
Modigliani theorem, which characterizes the conditions under which a firm’s capital structure is “irrelevant.” Since 
the existence of agency problems violates the Modigliani-Miller conditions for irrelevance, it implies that a manager 
might have to make hedging and risk-taking decisions at the level of the firm rather than the level of his own 
personal equity portfolio. Moreover, since managers are typically (much) more constrained than shareholders in 
their decisions regarding their equity holdings, they are often likely to be unable to make offsetting adjustments to 
their personal equity portfolios, and can only make adjustments at the firm level. 
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Lewellen (2006), Low (2009), and Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012). Collectively, these studies 
provide evidence that executives’ equity incentives influence their risk-taking decisions. 
We add to the second strand of the literature by examining whether the ability to hedge 
uncontrollable risk that was previously difficult and at least costly to manage influences the 
design of compensation contracts. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, using a 
difference-in-differences research design, we find that our sample firms experience a statistically 
significant and economically meaningful decline in the covariance of their stock returns with 
weather following the introduction of weather derivatives. This result suggests that our sample 
firms did, in fact, make use of weather derivatives to hedge at least some portion of their 
exposure to weather risk. Second, we find that our sample CEOs’ total annual compensation—
including both its cash and equity grant components—declined following the introduction of 
weather derivatives. We attribute this decline in annual compensation to a reduction in the risk 
premium that CEOs demand for bearing uncontrollable weather risk associated with their 
incentives (e.g., their stock and option holdings). Third, we find that our sample CEOs’ equity 
portfolios changed following the introduction of weather derivatives: equity Portfolio Delta 
declined by 8.1% and equity Portfolio Vega declined by 34.3%. Collectively, our results are 
consistent with the costly risk hypothesis: when stock price becomes a more precise measure of 
CEOs’ actions (i.e., a more precise performance measure), it takes fewer incentives (i.e., less 
Delta and Vega) to provide the same amount of total incentives. This interpretation suggests that 
boards provided CEOs with a certain amount of incentives before hedging was possible, and they 
continue to provide the same amount of incentives—which requires less equity—after hedging 
became available.  
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Our study makes several contributions to the incentive-compensation and corporate risk-
taking literatures. First, our research setting that is characterized by the introduction of an 
economically important hedging tool allows us to construct a powerful set of tests that speak to 
several important questions regarding the design of executives’ incentive compensation contracts. 
Specifically, our tests speak to how the magnitude of risk—and the ability to eliminate a portion 
of this risk through hedging—affects the design of executives’ incentive-compensation contracts. 
Prior empirical research on the design of executive’s incentive-compensation contracts is 
hampered by concerns about the endogenous relation between executives’ contracts and 
characteristics of their contracting environments—especially firm risk (e.g., Armstrong, 2014; 
Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn, 1990; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; 
Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009). The introduction of weather derivatives provides a relatively 
large change in executives’ ability to hedge an important component of their firm’s risk. More 
importantly, this change is arguably exogenous with respect to executives’ contracts, thereby 
allowing us to draw (causal) inferences regarding the effect of firm risk on the design of 
executives’ incentive-compensation contracts and their incentives to take risk.  
Second, we contribute to the agency literature by quantifying the magnitude of agency 
costs associated with exposing executives’ to non-controllable risk in performance measures. In 
particular, the magnitude of the change in risk-taking incentives provides insight into the 
magnitude of the agency costs associated with exposing CEOs to uncontrollable risk (or, 
alternatively, the cost of not having precise enough performance measures available for 
contracting). 
Although our research setting necessarily requires us to focus on a relatively small 
sample of companies that are most affected by the introduction of weather derivatives, it allows 
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us to construct relatively powerful and focused empirical tests. What we lose in generality, we 
gain in internal validity. In this regard, our evidence complements large-sample studies that 
examine the design and consequences of incentive-compensation contracts in the cross-section. 
Moreover, although we examine a relatively small sample of firms in a specific industry, it is 
instructive to consider how our result might extrapolate beyond our research setting. On one 
hand, the economic magnitude of the effects that we document might represent a lower bound on 
the importance of executives’ ability to hedge uncontrollable risk because utilities are a relatively 
stable industry with relatively low inherent volatility. On the other hand, if more risk-averse 
executives select into the utility industry (e.g., because of its relative stability), then the 
economic magnitude of the effects that we document might be large relative to the effects that 
one would expect in other industries.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We provide background information 
on weather derivatives and discuss related studies on the design of and incentives provided by 
executives’ incentive-compensation contracts in Section 2. We describe our research design in 
Section 3 and discuss our sample, data sources, and variable measurement in Section 4. We 
present our results in Section 5 and describe several supplemental sensitivity analyses in Section 
6. We provide concluding remarks in Section 7.  
 
2. Background 
2.1. Weather derivatives 
Weather derivatives are financial contracts with payoffs that are determined by the 
realization of weather-related events. Similar to other types of financial derivatives, these 
contracts can be used for either speculative or hedge—in the latter case, they can provide 
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protection against adverse weather conditions. A weather derivative’s payoff (or value) is 
determined by realized climatic conditions such as temperature, precipitation (e.g., rainfall and 
snowfall), or the occurrence of extreme events (e.g., hurricanes). A typical weather derivative 
contract specifies the following parameters: (1) an underlying weather measure (e.g., temperature 
or cumulative precipitation); (2) the location at which the weather is measured (e.g., a weather 
measurement station); (3) the contract period; (4) the exercise or “strike” price; and (5) a 
function that maps the realized weather measure to the contract’s monetary payout (Considine, 
2000).  
The most common type of weather derivatives are temperature-based futures that come in 
one of two varieties that are known as Heating Degree Day and Cooling Degree Day contracts 
(hereafter referred to as HDD and CDD, respectively). HDD and CDD capture—and can 
therefore be used to hedge—the energy demand for heating and cooling services, respectively.4 
The payoff of these contracts is based on the cumulative difference between the daily 
temperature and 65 degrees Fahrenheit (18 degrees Celsius) during a certain period of time (e.g., 
one month). The baseline temperature (i.e., 65 degrees Fahrenheit) is that at which there is 
relatively little demand for heating and cooling. HDD contracts payoff if the cumulative 
temperature is relatively low and, conversely, CDD contracts payoff if the cumulative 
temperature is relatively high.5  
The following excerpt from Washington Gas Light Co.’s 2007 Annual Report (Form 10K) 
provides an example of a weather derivative contract that is used to hedge weather risk.  
On October 5, 2006, Washington Gas purchased a new HDD derivative designed to 
provide full protection from warmer-than-normal weather in Virginia during the 
                                                 
4 According to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the trading volume of CME weather futures during 2003 more 
than quadrupled from the previous year and equaled roughly $1.6 billion in notional value. 
5  CDD = Max{0, 1/2*(Tmax+Tmin)-65} and HDD = Max{0, 65-1/2*(Tmax+Tmin)}, where Tmax and Tmin are the 
maximum and minimum temperature, respectively, measured in degrees Fahrenheit over a specific period. 
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upcoming 2006-2007 winter heating season. Washington Gas will receive $25,500 for 
every HDD below 3,735 during the period October 15, 2006 through April 30, 2007. The 
maximum amount that Washington Gas can receive under this arrangement is 
$9.4 million. The pre-tax expense of this derivative is $2.5 million, which is being 
amortized over the pattern of normal HDDs during the 6.5-month term of the weather 
derivative. 
This contract was based on the number of Heating Degree Days (HHD), which is the contractual 
measure of the underlying weather outcome. The contract covered the period October 15, 2006 
through April 30, 2007 (essentially the winter of 2006-07) and had an exercise (or “strike”) price 
of 3,735. If the winter had been warmer than usual, Washington Gas would have received 
$25,500 for each HDD below the strike price. The winter of 2006-07 turned out to be colder than 
usual, and the actual HDD was 3,955, which exceed the contract’s strike price. Accordingly, 
Washington Gas was not entitled to any payment from this particular weather derivative, and the 
contract expired worthless.6 
Prior to introduction of weather derivatives, firms with significant exposure to the 
weather had only a limited number of financial instruments with which they could hedge this risk. 
                                                 
6 The financial accounting treatment of derivative instruments was not standardized until the introduction of SFAS 
133 (Accounting for Derivatives and Hedging Activities), which became in June of 2001. Prior to SFAS 133, 
guidance for accounting for derivatives under US GAAP was inconsistent and, in the opinion of many commentators, 
inadequate. For example, US GAAP provided no guidance for community hedging. SFAS 133 (paragraph 235) 
notes that “before the issuance of this statement, accounting standards specifically addressed only a few types of 
derivatives” and that “many derivative instruments were carried ‘off-balance-sheet’ regardless of whether they were 
formally part of a hedging strategy.” In addition, prior to SFAS 133, “the required accounting treatment differed 
depending on the type of instrument used in a hedge and the type of risk being hedged” and “the accounting 
standards were inconsistent on whether qualification for hedge accounting was based on risk assessment at an entity-
wide or an individual-transaction level” (SFAS 133, paragraph 236).  
Prior to SFAS 133, derivative reporting was governed by SFAS 119, which was introduced in 1994, and 
regulated disclosure about derivative financial instruments (including their fair value). However, the standard was 
vague about the type of information that companies should report and how the information should be reported. For 
example, there was little guidance about what constituted a hedge and how hedges should be recorded. As a result, 
there were discrepancies in how companies reported the different types of market risk, which diminished financial 
statement comparability. In 1997, the SEC amended its rules regarding the form, content, and requirements for 
financial statements in the U.S. Securities Acts. In particular, the SEC amendments defined key items (e.g., methods 
to account for derivatives at every point in their life cycle and criteria needed for the accounting method used) that 
companies were supposed to include in their footnotes related to their derivative transactions and positions. Those 
amendments helped to clarify the disclosure requirements of SFAS 119 and provided more definitive guidance about 
the quantitative and qualitative information to report about the market risk of derivatives and other financial 
instruments. This also precipitated the development of SFAS 133 in the late 1990s. 
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Moreover, those instruments that were available (e.g., individual contracts with large property 
and casualty insurers acting as counterparties) often provided an imperfect hedge.7 One example 
is the use of agriculture commodity futures because commodity prices and its demand are 
affected by weather conditions. However, agricultural commodity futures often yield imperfect 
hedges and are subject to basis risk. An alternative is to buy a weather insurance contract with a 
property and casualty insurer. However, like most other insurance contracts, these only provide 
protection against catastrophic damage, but do nothing to protect against the reduced demand 
that businesses experience as a result of weather that is warmer or colder than expected. 
One drawback with weather insurance contracts is the difficulty in attributing loss 
incurred to the insured weather event. For example, it is probably easier to provide proof to 
definitively link losses to hurricane that wipe out a corn crop but it is harder to definitively link 
the losses to mild drought. The farmer might be subject to counterclaim from insurance company 
that he did not irrigate properly. This often results in high insurance premium to reduce potential 
moral hazard problem (Gardener and Rogers, 2003). In practice, weather insurance only tends to 
be useful for hedging against infrequent (i.e., low probability), but costly events (Myer, 2008). In 
contrast, weather derivative contracts can be used to protect against less detrimental, but higher-
probability events such as droughts or warmer-than-usual winters.  
Weather derivatives also differ from conventional insurance contracts in several 
important respects. First, weather derivatives are financial instruments with payoffs that are tied 
to objective, measurable weather events such as hours of sunshine, amount of precipitation, snow 
depth, temperature, or wind speed. These realizations are measured at different weather stations 
                                                 
7 Under SFAS 133, the accounting treatment for hedges is very complicated, burdensome, and costly to implement. 
Several studies examine the relevance of SFAS 133 to risk management activities and document mixed evidence. 
For example, Singh (2004) and Park (2004) find no significant change in earnings volatility after the adoption of 
SFAS 133, while Zhang (2009) finds that some firms changed their risk management activities after the adoption of 
SFAS 133. 
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around the country, and cannot be influenced by the holder of a weather derivative. 
Consequently, the contractual payoffs are difficult to manipulate. In contrast, loss payments from 
conventional insurance contracts can be manipulated by the insured, and therefore present 
significant moral hazard problems. Second, the loss settlement process for weather derivatives 
depends on measurements (e.g., temperature or hours of sunshine) that are collected for other 
purposes and therefore constitute a negligible marginal cost of contract settlement. In contrast, 
the settlement process for conventional insurance contracts usually entails costly investigation 
and verification at the loss site, and can even involve litigation before a final settlement of claims 
is reached. Third, credit risk is present with insurance contracts, but is limited through 
monitoring by insurance regulators, external audits, and debt and claims-paying rating agencies. 
In contrast, some weather derivatives are traded on exchanges, which virtually eliminates any 
credit risk.8 Fourth, exchange-traded weather contracts provide the holder the opportunity to 
trade out at relatively low costs if the market moves in adverse directions. In contrast, insurance 
contracts cannot be traded and cancellation by the insured during the contract term can involve 
significant transaction costs. Fifth, an important advantage to the firm-specific nature of 
insurance contracts is that they can create perfect or near-perfect hedges for firm exposures, 
subject to deductibles and contract limits. However, exchange-traded weather derivatives usually 
have some basis risk. Deals completed over-the-counter better limit basis risk through contract 
customization.  
Absent suitable financial instruments with which to hedge, managers can also engage in 
“real actions” to hedge their risk. For example, a firm could diversify its operations across either 
product lines or geographic regions to reduce its total exposure to the weather. For example, a 
                                                 
8 Although credit risk remains with over-the-counter weather risk trading, some protection is provided by the 
International Securities and Derivatives Association and external audits of financial records. 
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snowmobile manufacturer may decide to produce jet skis to mitigate their revenue dependence 
on winter weather. However, such diversification strategies are often expensive to implement 
and their efficacy in managing risks and creating are questioned by prior studies (Berger and 
Ofek, 1995; Lamont and Polk, 2002). Another way to manage the risk through changes in real 
operation is to use long-term fixed-price contracts. For example, a natural gas combined-cycle 
power plant can enter a long-term contract with a gas supplier to lock in the gas price and 
volume for several years. However, such a hedging strategy leaves little operating flexibility 
especially in face of adverse gas price movement. 
Utilities may use regulatory measures to minimize the impact of weather. Weather 
normalization adjustment (WNA) is a method of adjusting customers’ bills to reflect normal, 
rather than actual, weather conditions, which effectively allows utilities to transfer weather risk 
to consumers during unexpected weather seasons. However, the WNA does not cover the 
unregulated portion of energy firms’ business and are not available in every state. The cash flow 
recovery may lag weather shocks, particularly in extreme cases, and is subject to regulatory and 
political risk. 
The first over-the-counter (OTC) weather derivative contract was introduced in 1997, 
primarily in response to severe and unexpected weather conditions caused by the 1997 to 1998 
El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Compared to the aforementioned methods that had been 
previously available, weather derivatives provide a more efficient and effective way for firms 
with significant exposure to the weather to manage this source of risk. According to the Weather 
Risk Management Association, the total value of weather derivative contract traded on the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange was nearly $8 billion in 2003 and increased to roughly $45.2 
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billion by 2006. 9 Moreover, fueled by demand for greater control over earnings, hardening 
insurance markets, and growing interest in weather derivatives by the investment banking and 
insurance communities, the weather derivative market has expanded  beyond the U.S., both in 
terms of the types of risks being addressed and the nationalities of firms involved in the 
market.10   
2.2. Equity incentives and firm risk  
Risk-averse and undiversified managers who have most of their wealth tied to the value 
of their firm have an incentive to reject positive net present value projects that are sufficiently 
risky. A number of authors have suggested that because the expected payoff of an option is 
increasing in the volatility of the underlying stock’s return, compensating risk-averse managers 
with stock options will encourage them to take risks (Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 
1985). However, subsequent studies (e.g., Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Carpenter, 
2000; Ross, 2004; Lewellen, 2006) point out that executives who cannot sell or otherwise hedge 
the risk associated with their options will not value them at their market value but will instead 
value them subjectively through the lens of their own preferences. Consequently, granting stock 
options to a risk-averse executive may not necessarily increase that executive’s appetite for risk. 
These studies note that stock options not only increase the convexity of a manager’s payoff by 
increasing the sensitivity of his wealth to firm risk, or vega, but also increase the sensitivity of 
his wealth to changes in stock price, or delta. Although the increase in vega unambiguously 
induces a manager to take more risks, the corresponding increase in delta magnifies the 
manager’s aversion to firm risk because a given change in stock price has a larger impact on the 
                                                 
9 http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/weather/forecast/2008-06-09-weather-derivative_N.htm. 
10 Counties in which weather transactions have been completed include the U.S, U.K, Australia, France, Germany, 
Norway, Sweden, Mexico and Japan. Standardized weather derivative contracts are now listed on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME), The Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), and the London International Financial Futures 
and Options Exchange (LIFFE). 
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value of the manager’s firm-specific portfolio. Thus, the net effect of greater option 
compensation on managerial risk-taking is ambiguous.  
These theories motivated a number of early empirical studies, which generally found a 
positive relationship between stock options and various measures of firm risk (e.g., Agrawal and 
Mandelker, 1987; DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn, 1990; Tufano, 1996; Schrand and Unal, 1998; 
Guay, 1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002). More recent studies (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Low, 
2009) acknowledge the different theoretical predictions regarding the relationship between vega 
and delta and firm risk, and thus, account for them separately in their empirical specifications. 
Although all of these studies document a positive relationship between vega and firm risk, they 
provide mixed evidence on the relationship between delta and firm risk.11 In contrast to these 
studies, however, Lewellen (2006) finds that options actually discourage managerial risk-taking 
for empirically plausible parameter values in a certainty-equivalent framework.  
Coles et al. (2006), Low (2009), and others note that one possible explanation for the 
mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between stock options and firm risk is that because 
equity incentives and firm risk are endogenously related, the relationship is difficult to 
empirically identify. Because managers’ compensation is arguably designed in anticipation of a 
particular risk environment, it is difficult to rule out the possibility of reverse causality. There 
have been several attempts to overcome this identification challenge. For example, several 
studies estimate a system of simultaneous equations or rely on instrument variables (e.g., 
Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012; Coles et al., 2006). However, 
                                                 
11 For example, Coles et al. (2006) report mixed results regarding the effect of delta for various measures of risk-
taking. On one hand, they find that delta is positively associated with firm focus and return volatility, an outcome 
that suggests that delta encourages risk-taking. On the other hand, they find that delta makes managers more risk-
averse by encouraging them to increase capital expenditures, decrease R&D expenditures, and decrease leverage. 
Low (2009) also concludes that her evidence on the relationship between delta and managerial risk-taking is 
inconclusive.  
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these approached rely on the validity of an untestable exclusion restriction. Gormley et al. (2013) 
address the identification challenge by examining relatively large changes in firms’ business 
environments that increase their “left-tail risk.” However, Armstrong (2013) raises concerns 
about the extent to which this shock produced material changes in the contracting environment. 
 
3. Research Design 
The introduction of weather derivatives in 1997 provided firms that were exposed to 
weather-related risks with an efficient way to manage (i.e., hedge) these risks. And, importantly 
for our research design, the introduction of weather derivatives was arguably exogenous from the 
perspective of any particular firm and with respect to the outcomes that we are interested in.12 
reduction in the cost of hedging weather risks. Furthermore, we expect weather derivative 
contracts to disproportionately benefit those firms that were historically more subject to local 
weather shocks. We explore both time series and cross sectional variations using a difference-in-
difference regression design.  
3.1. Sensitivity of equity market returns to weather 
 Our first analysis examines the sensitivity of our sample firms’ equity market returns to 
weather fluctuations. If the introduction of weather derivatives was, in fact, an economically 
important event for these firms, then it should produce an empirically detectible change in the 
sensitivity of their equity market returns to fluctuations in the weather. We conduct this analysis 
                                                 
12 The distinction between an event being exogenous and the event being exogenous with respect to any particular 
firm is crucial for our study. The former use of the word “exogenous” is synonymous with “stochastic” or “random” 
and carries an unconditional connotation. The latter use of the word “exogenous” is more relaxed notion and 
acknowledges that many—if not most—events that are used as the basis for so-called “natural experiments” (e.g., 
regulations) are not exogenous in the literal sense, but are the outcome of some deliberate (in the case of legislation, 
regulation, or court rulings) or are the result of competitive market forces (e.g., supply and demand), as is the case in 
our research setting. The efficacy of using events of the latter type as “natural experiment” depends on the event not 
being in response to a particular firm of interest. If such a condition holds, even though the event is not “exogenous” 
in the sense of being “random,” it can still be “exogenous” from the perspective of any particular firm.  
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in two steps. First, we regress each exposed firm’s daily stock returns over a one-year period on 
the three Fama-French factors and a daily measure of EDD measure. The resulting specification 
is as follows. 
Reti,t = β0 + β1Sizet + β2Hmlt + β3Mktt + β4EDDt + εi,t    (1) 
Where i indexes firms and t indexes time (i.e., each one-year period). EDD proxies for total 
weather exposure and is defined as the sum of HDD and CDD, which are calculated as Max{0, 
65-½*(Tmax+Tmin)} and Max{0, ½*(Tmax+Tmin)-65}, respectively, Tmax and Tmin are the 
maximum and minimum daily temperature measured in degrees Fahrenheit, respectively. Further, 
we only estimate Eq. (1) for firm-years with at least 60 daily observations. We refer to the 
estimated coefficient β4 as a firm’s “weather beta.”  
It is important to note that utilities can potentially benefit from hedging weather risks 
irrespective of the sign of their weather beta. For example, some firms may benefit from 
abnormally cold weather, whereas others may be negatively affected by cold weather conditions. 
Therefore, the absolute value of the estimated coefficient β4 captures the sensitivity of the firm’s 
equity returns to weather. A reduction in the absolute value of β4 indicates a reduction in the 
sensitivity of the firm’s equity returns to weather. In addition, to obtain an estimate of stock 
return volatility that is attributable to weather exposure, we multiply the estimated weather betas 
by the annualized volatility of EDD, or |β4|*volatility(EDD).   
In the second step, we use each firm-year’s estimated exposure to weather risk (i.e., either 
|β4| or |β4|*volatility(EDD)) as the dependent variable in the following difference-in-difference 
regression.13 
                                                 
13 Since the dependent variables in the “second-stage” given by Eq. (2) are estimated rather than observed (i.e., so 
called “estimated dependent variables”), the residual in the Eq. (2) inherits sampling uncertainty from the “first-
stage” regressions. To ensure that our second-stage estimates are consistent and efficient, we weight each 
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      WeatherRiskit = β0,it + β1,itAftert × Treatedi + γ'Xit + FirmFE + YearFE + εit             (2) 
Where i and t index firms and time, respectively. After is an indicator that equals one from 1998 
onwards and zero otherwise. Treated is a firm-specific indicator that equals one if the firm’s 
historical (i.e., pre-1997) weather exposure is relatively high, which is explained in more detail 
in Section 3.3. X represents a vector of control variables, which are also discussed in more detail 
below. FirmFE denotes firm fixed effects, which are included to abstract away from (i.e., 
“control for”) cross-sectional variation in weather exposure so that the resulting empirical 
specification relies primarily on within-firm (i.e., time-series) variation in firms’ exposure to 
weather risk. Similarly, YearFE denotes year fixed effects, which are included to abstract away 
from any systematic temporal effects on firms’ exposure to weather risk that are unrelated to the 
introduction of weather derivatives. Note that we do not include separate indicators (i.e., main 
effects) for either Treated or After, since neither would be identified in the presence of firm and 
year fixed effects.  
3.2. CEO compensation 
Our tests in the previous section are designed to assess whether the introduction of 
weather derivatives did, in fact, have an empirically discernible effect on the equity returns of 
firms with relatively large potential exposures to weather risk. To the extent that the introduction 
of weather derivatives allows these firms to alter their exposure to weather risk, it could have an 
effect on the design of their executive’s incentive-compensation contracts. To determine whether 
attributes of executives’ incentive-compensation contracts changed following the introduction of 
weather derivatives, we estimate the following difference-in-difference specification. 
        Compit = β0,it + β1,it Aftert × WeatherExpi + γ'Xit + FirmFE + YearFE + εit              (3) 
                                                                                                                                                             
observation by the inverse of the estimated variance of dependent variables from the first-stage (Hornstein and 
Greene, 2012). 
- 17 - 
 
where i and t index firms and time, respectively. Comp represents one of several measures of 
CEOs’ annual compensation that we discuss in more detail in Section 4. The remaining variables 
are as defined in the previous subsection in the context of Eq. (2).  
 We include the determinants of CEO incentive-compensation identified by prior research 
(e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2008), including CEO 
Tenure measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years that the executive has 
held the CEO title; Firm Size measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets; Firm 
Age measured as the natural logarithm of one plus number of years since stock price data for the 
firm becomes available from CRSP; Leverage measured as the total of short-term and long-term 
debt scaled by total assets; the Book-to-Market ratio is included to capture growth opportunities; 
and ROA and Stock Return to measure firms’ accounting and stock returns, respectively. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 0.5% percentile in each tail. A more detailed 
description of the variables is provided in the Appendix. 
In general, a difference-in-differences research design examines the change in an 
outcome (i.e., the dependent variable) around an event of interest for two groups of firms that 
differ in the extent to which they are presumed to be affected by the event. The difference 
between the changes (or “differences”) experienced by the two groups of firms provides an 
estimate of the (causal) effect of the event on the outcome. The crucial maintained identifying 
assumption in a difference-in-differences research design is that the two groups of firms that 
differ in the exposure to the event would have continued to exhibit the same time-trend in the 
outcome, but for the occurrence of the event. This so-called “parallel trends” assumption 
facilitates inferences about the causal effect of the event by allowing the relatively less exposed 
group of firms to be used as a counterfactual against which the relatively more exposed firms can 
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be compared. In our research setting, the difference-in-differences specification in Eq. (3) 
compares one of several annual compensation measures before and after the introduction of 
weather derivatives (the first difference) between firms that are relatively more and less 
influenced by the weather (the second difference). The resulting estimate of β1 indicates the 
(causal) effect of the introduction of weather derivatives on the different components of CEOs’ 
annual compensation. 
3.3. CEO equity portfolio incentives 
We also estimate a model of CEO equity portfolio incentives (i.e., equity portfolio Delta 
and Vega) that is similar to Eq. (3). Since the theoretical determinants of equity portfolio 
incentives are somewhat different from those of annual compensation and its various 
components (e.g., cash, bonus, equity grants), we rely on a set of control variables that is similar 
to those in the compensation specifications, although several are included for different reasons. 
First, we include a proxy for firm size to capture variation in talent and wealth across CEOs.14 
Prior literature has argued that larger firms require more talented CEOs and that CEOs of larger 
firms tend to have more wealth (Smith and Watts, 1992; Core and Guay, 1999). We therefore 
predict a positive relationship between firm size and the level of equity incentives. Next, we 
expect the consequences of managerial risk aversion (i.e., rejecting risky but positive net present 
value projects) to be more costly to shareholders of firms with more investment opportunities. 
We also expect that it is more difficult to monitor managers of firms with greater investment 
opportunities, so equity incentives will be used as a substitute mechanism for mitigating agency 
costs in these firms (Smith and Watts, 1992). We therefore expect both types of equity incentives 
to be negatively associated with the book-to-market ratio. Finally, we control for CEO tenure, 
                                                 
14 Our results are similar when we include CEO fixed effects to capture heterogeneity in compensation that is due to 
unobservable, time-invariant CEO characteristics such as skill and risk-tolerance. We describe these results in more 
detail in Section 6. 
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which we expect to capture both experience (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992) and the degree to 
which there might be horizon problems as a result of an anticipated departure (Dechow and 
Sloan, 1991).  
 
4. Variable Measurement and Sample Selection 
4.1. Measurement of firms’ weather exposure 
We measure our sample firms’ pre-1997 weather exposure following the procedure 
developed by Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2013), which estimates the portion of firms’ revenue 
volatility that is related to weather fluctuations based on the following specification. 
Rev/Assetsit = β0,i + β1,i EDDit+ γi ln(Assetsit) + εit                                                               (4) 
Where Rev/Assetsit is quarterly revenue scaled by ending total asset. We also include the natural 
logarithm of total assets as a measure of firm size that is intended to control for fluctuations in 
revenue attributable to sources other than the weather. EDD is the accumulation of daily CDD 
and HDD for each quarter and is measured at the firm’s historical corporate headquarter location. 
We estimate Eq. (4) separately for each firm in our sample using data from 1980 to 1997 and we 
require each firm to have at least 40 quarterly observations. To estimate the volatility of each 
firm’s revenue that is attributable to weather fluctuations, we multiply the absolute value of the 
estimated beta (𝛽𝛽1�) by the historical standard deviation of EDD during the 1980-1997 estimation 
period. A firm is classified as having a relatively high exposure to weather if the resulting value 
is above the sample median and, conversely, relatively low exposure to weather if the resulting 
value is below the sample median.15 
4.2. Measurement of CEO incentive-compensation 
                                                 
15 It is possible that weather exposure affects mainly the cost structure of a firm (e.g., extremely cold weather may 
increase the maintenance costs of a gas distribution pipe). We consider alternative definitions of weather exposure 
based on the sensitivity of firms’ stock returns to weather in Section 6. 
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We examine a comprehensive set of various attributes of CEOs’ incentive-compensation 
contracts based on data from the Execucomp database. Our first four measures are related to the 
composition (or “mix”) and magnitude (or “level”) of  CEOs’ annual compensation and are (1) 
CashComp, defined as the natural logarithm of the sum of the CEO’s annual salary and bonus 
payments, (2) EquityComp, defined as the natural logarithm of an adjusted Black-Scholes value 
of the CEO’s restricted stock and option grants received during the year, (3) TotalComp, defined 
as the natural logarithm of the value of the CEO’s total annual compensation (i.e., salary, bonus, 
restricted stock and option grants, and long-term incentive plan payouts), and (4) EquityMix, 
defined as EquityComp divided by TotalComp.  
In addition to these four measures of CEOs’ annual (or “flow”) compensation, we also 
examine two common measures of the incentives provided by CEOs’ equity portfolio (i.e., stock 
and option) holdings. The first measure of equity incentives is Portfolio Delta, which measures 
the sensitivity of a CEO’s equity portfolio value to changes in stock price. The second measure 
of equity incentives is Portfolio Vega, which measures the sensitivity of a CEO’s equity portfolio 
value to changes in volatility of stock returns. We follow prior literature (e.g., Core and Guay, 
1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006) and measure Portfolio Delta as 
the natural logarithm of the change in the risk-neutral (Black-Scholes) value of the CEO’s equity 
portfolio for a 1% change in the firm’s stock price and Portfolio Vega as the natural logarithm of 
the change in the risk-neutral (Black-Scholes) value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 0.01 
change in the risk of the company’s stock (measured by standard deviation of the firm’s 
return).16,17 
                                                 
16 The parameters of the Black-Scholes formula are calculated as follows. Annualized volatility is calculated using 
continuously compounded monthly returns over the previous 60 months, with a minimum of twelve months of 
returns, and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. If the stock has traded for less than one year, we use the 
imputed average volatility of the firms in the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 1500. The risk-free rate is calculated using 
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4.3. Sample selection  
The sample period for our primary tests runs from 1993 to 2002, which includes five 
years before and five years following the introduction of weather derivatives. We start with 370 
unique utilities that engaged in the generation or distribution of electricity or natural gas 
(Standard Industrial Classification Codes 4911, 4923, 4924, 4931 and 4932). We then require the 
following information for each firm: (1) the location of the firm’s headquarters18 (we lose 49 
firms), (2) at least ten years of quarterly data prior to 1997 to estimate the firm’s historical 
exposure to weather risk (we lose 68 firms), (3) valid historical temperature measurements in the 
firm’s county from the North America Land Data Assimilation System available from Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 19  (4) Execucomp data to calculate incentive-
compensation measures (we lose 45 firms), and (5) financial information from Compustat and 
CRSP. We also require that the firm has at least one year of data before and after the introduction 
of weather derivatives for the difference-in-differences specification (we lose 96 firms). Our 
final sample consists of 112 unique utility firms and 899 firm-year observations for which we 
have the required data for all of our analyses.  
                                                                                                                                                             
the interpolated interest rate on a Treasury Note with the same maturity (to the closest month) as the remaining life 
of the option, multiplied by 0.70 to account for the prevalence of early exercise. Dividend yield is calculated as the 
dividends paid during the previous twelve months scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the month. This is 
essentially the method described by Core and Guay (2002). 
17 An alternative to the dollar-holdings measure of the incentive to increase stock price is the fractional-holdings 
measure, calculated as the change in the (risk-neutral) value of the executive’s equity portfolio for a $1,000 change 
in firm value (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Baker and Hall (2004) and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) discuss how 
the suitability of each measure is context-specific and depends on how the CEO’s actions affect firm value. When 
the CEO’s actions affect the dollar returns of the firm (e.g., consuming perquisites), fractional holdings is a more 
appropriate measure of incentives. When the CEO’s actions affect the percentage returns of the firm (e.g., strategic 
decisions), dollar holdings are a more appropriate measure of incentives. Since we are concerned about strategic 
actions that affect the firm’s risk profile, we rely on the dollar-holdings measure of incentives. 
18 Compustat reports the address of a firm’s current principal executive office, which could be different from its 
historical address if the firm has changed the location of its headquarters. Since most utilities are regional 
distributors of electricity and/or gas, we rely on company headquarter information to estimate their weather 
exposure. We extract historical headquarter locations from historical 10-K filings from the SEC’s Edgar database. If 
the historical 10-K is not available for a particular year, we use the 10-K from the closest available year. 
19 http://wonder.cdc.gov/nasa-nldas.html.  
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4.4. Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A reports descriptive 
statistics for different measures of weather sensitivity. The Fama-French three-factor model and 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model both produce similar estimates. In particular, Panel A 
shows that the average return sensitivity to weather is 0.75 and that weather betas exhibit 
substantial dispersion with standard deviations of 0.86 and 0.90 when calculated according the 
three- and four-factor models, respectively. These estimates indicate that the utilities in our 
sample have both relatively large average exposure to the weather as well as substantial variation 
in the extent to which they are exposed to the weather.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the various incentive variables. The 
mean (median) of our sample CEOs’ annual cash compensation is $849,000 ($738,000) and they 
have an average Equity Mix of 22%. The mean (median) sensitivity of their equity holdings to 
stock price and stock return volatility, Delta and Vega, are 3.44 (3.45) and 2.27 (2.61), 
respectively. Because our sample firms are drawn from a relatively unique industry, we also 
report the average values of the incentive-compensation measures for non-utilities in the 
Execucomp database. Panel B shows that relative to CEOs in other industries, the CEOs in our 
sample receive less total compensation and have lower levels of equity incentives. 
Panel C of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for several firm characteristics. Several 
noteworthy observations are as follows. The average (i.e., mean) tenure of the CEOs in our 
sample is 6.4 years and the average firm has total assets $7,543 million. The average stock 
market and accounting returns of our sample firms are 10% and 3%, respectively. In addition, 
our sample firms have an average book-to-market ratio of 0.67 and leverage ratio of 37%. We 
also report similar descriptive statistics for the non-utility firms in the Compustat database for 
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comparative purposes.20 These descriptive statistics indicate that the firms in our sample are, on 
average, larger, have fewer growth opportunities, and are more levered than their counterparts in 
other industries. These differences are not surprising because utilities are more heavily regulated 
and relatively more assets intensive, which explains their larger size and differences in their 
capital structure. The differences that we document are also consistent with prior studies that 
examine utilities (e.g., Perez-Gonzalez and Yun, 2013; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Jin and 
Jorion, 2006). 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Sensitivity of equity market returns to weather 
 Table 2 presents results from estimating the sensitivity of our sample firms’ equity 
returns to the weather. The two sets of columns report estimates for weather exposure relative to 
the three Fama-French factors and the three Fama-French factors plus the momentum factor, 
respectively. The results from both specifications indicate that the firms in our sample 
experienced a significant reduction in their exposure to (i.e., co-movement with) weather 
fluctuations following the introduction of weather derivatives. This finding is consistent with the 
firms in our sample using weather derivatives, after they become available, to reduce their 
exposure to weather fluctuations. Moreover, the economic magnitude of our sample firms’ 
reduction in their exposure to weather risk following the introduction of weather derivatives is 
                                                 
20 The mean ROA of -0.18 reported in Panel C of Table 2 for the sample of Compustat non-utilities is partially due 
to the presence of “penny stocks.” If we exclude firms that have a share price of $5 or less, the mean (median) ROA 
for the sample of non-utilities is -0.06 (0.03). 
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large: when weather exposure is calculated using the Fama-French three factor model, our 
sample firms experienced an average reduction in their exposure to weather of roughly 21%.21 
5.2. CEO compensation  
Our next set of tests examines whether several aspects of CEOs’ annual compensation 
changed following the introduction of weather derivatives. The results reported in column (1) of 
Table 3 indicate that the total annual compensation of the CEOs in our sample declined by 
roughly 25% (t-statistic of -3.02) following the introduction of weather derivatives. Columns (2) 
and (3) indicate that the decline in total annual compensation comes from a reduction in both its 
cash and equity components.22 The decline in total annual compensation—as well as its separate 
components—is consistent with our prediction that weather derivatives allow executives to 
hedge uncontrollable risk that they would otherwise have to bear and, consequently, they 
demand less of a risk premium in their annual compensation (Core and Guay, 2010; Conyon, 
Core, and Guay, 2011). 
Column (4) reports estimates for EquityMix, which is the proportion of total annual 
compensation in the form of equity and is thought to be more risky from the perspective of a 
risk-averse CEO. The coefficient on After*Treated shows that the fraction of our sample CEOs’ 
compensation in the form of stock and options declined by an average of 10% following the 
introduction of weather derivatives. Together with the results in the first three columns, this 
result indicates that the CEOs in our sample not only receive less total annual compensation 
following the introduction of weather derivatives, but that they also receive less of their 
                                                 
21 The mean of our sample firm’s Weather Beta is 0.746. The coefficient on After*Treated in column (1) of Table 2 
of -0.16 implies a 21% (= -0.16 / 0.746) reduction in Weather Beta. 
22 We obtain similar results when we jointly estimate the two equations for cash and equity compensation using 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) (Zellner, 1962), which accommodates correlation between the errors of the 
two equations. In particular, we estimate the SUR using Stata command SUREG. Since this Stata routine does not 
allow for clustering of standard errors, we use bootstrapped standard errors. 
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compensation in the form of equity (i.e., restricted stock and options). One explanation for the 
decline in the relative use of equity is that hedging with weather derivatives eliminates 
uncontrollable noise from stock price, which makes it relatively more informative about a CEO’s 
actions. Accordingly, from an incentive perspective, CEOs have to hold fewer units of equity to 
have the same exposure to (i.e., incentives from) stock price (Park and Vrettos, 2015; Tsui, 2015). 
5.3. CEO equity portfolio incentives 
Table 4 presents estimates of the models of CEOs’ equity portfolio incentives. The first 
column examines how the introduction of weather derivatives affected the sensitivity of CEOs’ 
equity portfolio values to changes in stock price, or Delta. The coefficient on the interaction 
variable is negative and statistically significant (t-statistic of -2.37), which indicates that our 
sample CEOs tend to have lower levels of equity incentives following the introduction of 
weather derivatives. In particular, the economic magnitude is large: on average, CEOs have 
roughly 8.1% less equity portfolio Delta following the introduction of weather derivatives 
relative to its mean.23 We find similar results for Vega. The coefficient on After*Treated is 
negative and significant (t-statistic of -3.79) and the magnitude of coefficient indicates that the 
CEOs in our sample have equity risk-taking incentives that are, on average, 34.3% lower 
following the introduction of weather derivatives.24  
                                                 
23 The mean of Portfolio Delta is 3.44. A coefficient of -0.28 implies a -8.1% (= -0.28/3.44) reduction in Delta 
relative to the control group following the introduction of weather derivatives.  
24 We also examine the sensitivity of annual compensation to stock market and accounting returns following the 
introduction of weather derivatives. In particular, we estimate following regression:  
Compit = β0,it + β1,it Aftert × WeatherExpi + β2,it Aftert × WeatherExpi × ROA + β3,it Aftert × WeatherExpi × 
Stock Returni + β4,it Aftert × WeatherExpi × ROAi + β5,it Aftert ×Stock Returni + β6,it Aftert × ROAi + β7,it 
WeatherExpi × Stock Returni + β8,it WeatherExpi × ROAi + γ'Xit + FirmFE + YearFE + εit.  
Untabulated results indicate no significant change in the weights assigned to stock market and accounting returns 
following the introduction of weather derivatives.              
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An auxiliary prediction related to CEOs’ equity portfolio holdings is that risk-averse 
executives should be willing to hold their options longer following the introduction of weather 
derivatives because they should be less exposed to uncontrollable risk. We construct a variable, 
Unex/Total, defined as the ratio of the value of vested (i.e., exercisable) in-the-money options to 
total vested options, to measure the timeliness of CEOs’ option exercise. Consistent with our 
prediction, we find that executives have a higher proportion of vested in-the-money options 
following the introduction of weather derivatives. The economic magnitude of our estimated 
indicates that, on average, our sample CEOs hold vested in-the-money exercisable options that 
are 11.4% more valuable relative to the mean. 
Overall, the results in Table 4 provide evidence that our sample firms are able to hedge at 
least some of the uncontrollable risk associated with the weather. Hedging this uncontrollable 
risk eliminates this source of “noise” from stock price and produces a more precise measure of 
CEOs’ performance. Since stock price is now a more precise measure of the CEO’s actions, it 
takes less Delta and Vega to provide the same amount of total incentives. In other words, since 
equity provides more incentives “per unit” following the introduction of weather derivatives, it 
requires fewer units (i.e., less Delta and Vega) to provide CEOs with the same total incentives as 
before hedging was possible.  
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis 
 Although the introduction of weather derivatives was arguably exogenous with respect to 
our variables of interest (i.e., executives’ incentive-compensation and risk-taking decisions) from 
the perspective of any particular firm, the introduction of weather derivatives can be 
characterized as a financial innovation that arose in response to market demand to buy and sell 
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weather risk. Much, if not most, of this demand undoubtedly came from the firms in our sample, 
which implies that the introduction of weather derivatives is unlikely to be exogenous with 
respect to our variables of interest from the perspective of the utility industry—or, more 
accurately, our sample firms—as a whole. We therefore conduct supplemental analyses to assess 
the sensitivity of our primary results to our maintained identifying assumptions. 
6.1. Evaluating the parallel trends assumption 
Inferences from our difference-in-differences specification rely on the maintained 
identifying assumption that, absent the treatment, both treated and control firms would have 
continued to exhibit similar trends. To assess the validity of this assumption, we examine 
whether firms with relatively high and relatively low exposures to weather risk did, in fact, 
exhibit parallel trends before the introduction of weather derivatives. In particular, we test for 
differences in CEOs’ incentive-compensation contracts between firms with relatively high and 
relatively low exposures to weather by estimating a difference-in-differences specification that is 
analogous to Eq. (2), except that we replace the After indicator with separate indicators for each 
of the four years surrounding the introduction of weather derivatives: After(-1), After(0), 
After(+1) and After(+2), which are indicators that equal one in the year before, the year of, the 
year after, and the second year after the introduction of weather derivatives, respectively.  
Table 5 shows that none of the pre-event variables are significant at conventional levels, 
which lends support to the maintained assumption that the firms with relatively high and 
relatively low exposures to the weather had parallel trends. Table 5 also shows that differences 
that we documented in CEOs’ incentive-compensation contracts start to be significantly reduced 
from 1999 onwards for all measures of compensation and incentives and for the equity 
component of compensation from 1997 onwards.  
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6.2 Reverse Causality 
If a broad coalition of executives in the utility industry—which our foregoing results 
show experienced a reduction in the level of both compensation and incentives—successfully 
lobbied for exchange-traded weather derivatives to reduce their exposure to uncontrollable risk, 
then the direction of causality might be reversed. Although the introduction of weather 
derivatives is largely attributed to El Nino Southern Oscillation events, we nevertheless address 
concerns about reverse causality as an explanation for our results. If the introduction of weather 
derivatives was a response to lobbying and pressure from executives (rather than El Nino), we 
should observe a decline on compensation prior to their introduction. However, our results in 
Table 5 suggest that reverse causality is unlikely to explain our results. In particular, the 
coefficient on Afterlaw(t=-1)*Treated is small and insignificant, which indicates that changes 
CEOs’ incentive-compensation occurred after, but not before, the introduction of weather 
derivatives. 
6.3. Changing business prospects and policies 
Although the introduction of weather derivatives was arguably exogenous from the 
perspective of any individual firm and we include firm fixed effects to capture time-invariant 
unobservable firm characteristics, our inference may still be confounded by a combination of 
business cycle variation across geographic regions or changes in state level policies (e.g. state-
level deregulation of utilities that remove weather normalization adjustments) during our sample 
period. To address this concern, we use include state of location and year joint fixed effects to 
capture the impact of variations in state-level business conditions on CEOs’ incentive-
compensation contracts. The results in Table 6 Panel A show that our results are robust to this 
alternative specification and that our primary inferences are unaltered. 
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Another concern is that change in state policies or rulings might happen at state of 
incorporation level rather than at state of location level. To mitigate this concern, we further 
include state of incorporation and year joint fixed effect in addition to firm fixed effects, state of 
location and year joint fixed effects.  The incremental R-square coming from incorporation-year 
joint fixed effects ranges from 3% to 8% and the results in Table 6 Panel B show that our 
primary inferences are unaltered. 
6.4. SFAS133 adoption and shorter event windows 
 The results in Table 7 speak to how our inferences are affected by altering the length of 
the window surrounding the introduction of weather derivatives. The choice of any particular 
sample period entails a cost-benefit tradeoff. The benefits of a longer window are twofold. First, 
expanding the window utilizes more data, which, in turn, produces more powerful statistical tests. 
Second, a wider window allows more time for both boards’ contracting decisions and executives’ 
risk-taking decisions to take effect and manifest in the data. The cost of using a wider window is 
that it introduces a greater chance of capturing differential trends that are unrelated to the event 
of interest, which, in our setting, is the introduction of weather derivatives. If our initial results 
reported in Tables 3 and 4 are due to a long-term trend rather than a relatively abrupt change 
caused by the introduction of weather derivatives, we should find coefficients that are larger in 
magnitude when we estimate the model using a wider window. Assessing the sensitivity of our 
results to alternative sample windows provides diagnostic evidence about the efficacy of our 
maintained identifying assumption.  
The second reason to use a shorter event window is to address concerns that our results 
are confounded by the adoption of accounting standard SFAS 133 (Accounting for Derivative 
Instruments and Hedging Activities) during our sample period. SFAS 133 establishes accounting 
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and reporting standards for derivative instruments and requires an entity to recognize all 
derivatives as either assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure those 
instruments at their fair value. The standard became effective for fiscal years beginning after 
June 15, 2000. Using a three-year event window around 1997 should reduce the risk that our 
results are due to confounding effects from the adoption of SFAS 133. 
The results in Table 7 show that using a shorter three-year window, five out of six 
variables are statistically significant at conventional levels and Delta is insignificant. The 
magnitudes are also somewhat smaller than those obtained from using a five-year window, 
which suggests that differential trends prior to the introduction of weather derivatives is unlikely 
to be responsible for our earlier findings. 
6.5. CEO preferences 
Although introduction of weather derivatives was arguably exogenous with respect to any 
particular firm, the amount of hedging that executives engage in once these derivative contracts 
became available is likely to be an endogenous choice. To mitigate concerns that our results are 
entirely attributable to such choices, we include CEO fixed effects in addition to firm and year 
fixed effects. CEO fixed effects should absorb time-invariant contracting choices that are related 
to CEOs’ innate characteristics and preference. The results in Table 8 shows that we obtain 
similar results when the specifications also include CEO fixed effects.  
6.6. Controlling for possible omitted variables 
 While the inclusion of various fixed effects and firm level controls alleviates concerns 
that our results are driven by some omitted variables, we evaluate a wide range of potential 
omitted variables including corporate financial vulnerability, governance, investment policies 
and payout policies. We measure corporate financial vulnerability using Altman Z score and 
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amount of corporate cash holding. We use capital expenditure, PPE growth and sales growth to 
capture general investment environment. We measure governance quality using proportion of 
institutional investor and we measure payout policy using dividend asset ratio. If these factors 
are related to choice of compensation structure, then they –rather than hedging of uncontrollable 
risk- might possibly explain our findings. To examine the sensitivity of our results to these 
possible omitted variables, we repeat our analysis but include these variables as additional 
controls. The results in Table 9 suggest that our conclusions remain unaffected. 
6.7. Alternative measure of weather exposure 
Another concern with our previous tests is that our measure of firms’ historical weather 
exposure, which is a key variable in our analysis, is somewhat subjective. Although our primary 
measure that relates weather volatility with firms’ revenue volatility is both intuitive and easy to 
calculate, it is possible that weather mainly affects cost structure of a firm. For example, 
extremely cold weather may adversely increase the maintenance and repair costs of gas 
distribution pipe. We therefore assess the sensitivity of our reported results to several alternative 
measures of firms’ historical weather exposure. In particular, for each firm-year, we re-estimate 
Eq. (1) by regressing the firm’s daily stock returns on the daily Fama-French three factors and 
EDD, which captures the sensitivity of stock return to weather fluctuations. A firm is classified 
as having relatively high exposure to the weather if its pre-1997 (i.e. 1993-1996) average beta 
estimate on the weather factor is above median. The results in Panel A of Table 10 show that our 
results are robust to this alternative measure of historical weather exposure. In addition, the 
results in Panel B show that the maintained assumption of parallel trends appears to be satisfied 
when we use the alternative measure of historical weather exposure. 
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7. Conclusion 
 We examine how executives’ ability to hedge uncontrollable weather-related risk that 
was previously difficult and costly to manage influences the design of executives’ incentive-
compensation contracts. The results in the paper suggest that boards respond quickly to changes 
in their firms’ business risk by adjusting the structure of CEOs’ incentive-compensation 
contracts. We find that CEOs receive less total annual compensation—and that this reduction is 
attributable to a decline in cash and equity compensation alike—following the introduction of 
weather derivatives. This finding is consistent with the notion that weather derivatives allow 
executives to hedge uncontrollable risk that they would otherwise have to bear and, consequently, 
they demand less of a risk premium in their annual compensation. We also document significant 
decline in CEOs’ equity incentives (i.e., Delta and Vega) following the introduction of weather 
derivatives. This suggests that hedging uncontrollable risk eliminates an important source of 
noise from stock price and produces a more precise measure of CEOs’ performance. Since stock 
price is now a more precise measure of the CEO’s action, fewer equity incentives (i.e., less Delta 
and Vega) are required to provide the same level of total incentives. Overall, our results show 
that firms’ risk-profiles and hedging opportunities affect the design and structure of CEOs’ 
incentive-compensation contracts. Our results also highlight the importance of controlling risk-
averse CEOs’ exposure to uncontrollable risk.  
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Appendix 
Variables Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Beta-FF For each year each firm, we regress daily stock return on Fama-French 3 factors and daily EDD. Beta-FF is the absolute value of the estimated coefficient on EDD. 
Risk-FF Beta-FF multiplies by volatility of EDD. 
Beta-FFM For each year each firm, we regress daily stock return on Fama-French 3 factors plus momentum factor and daily EDD. Beta-FF is the absolute value of the estimated coefficient on EDD. 
Risk-FFM Beta-FFM multiplies by volatility of EDD. 
Log Total Comp Log of total compensation. 
Log Cash Comp Log of Salary and Bonus.  
Log Equity Comp Log of value of the restricted stock plus value of the options  
Equity Mix Equity Comp/Total Comp 
Portfolio Vega Log of compensation Vega. Vega measures dollar change in wealth associated with a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of the firm’s returns and is obtained from Coles et al (2013). 
Portfolio Delta Log of compensation delta. Delta measures dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm’s stock price and is obtained from Coles et at (2013). 
Unex/Total Value of  in-the-money unexercised exercisable options divided by the total value of unexercised and exercised options 
Log Assets Log of total assets. 
Log Firm Age Log of firm age, where firm age is the year firm first appear in CRSP 
Log Stock Return Log of one plus stock return over fiscal year. 
ROA Net income plus extraordinary items and discontinued operation, all divided by lagged total asset. 
Leverage Short term debt plus long term debt minus cash, all over total asset. 
Book-to-Market Book value over market value of equity. 
Inst Own Percentage of outstanding equity owned by institutional investors 
Cash Cash/Total Assets 
Zscore 1.2*(current assets-current liabilities)/total assets+1.4*retained earnings/total assets+3.3*EBIT/total assets+0.6*market value of equity/total liabilites+0.99*sales/total assets. 
CAPEX Capital expenditure/total assets 
Sales Growth Sales growth 
PPE Growth PPE growth 
Dividend Cash dividend/total assets 
Afterlaw Dummy equal to one for observations from 1998 onwards. 
Afterlaw(-1) Dummy equal to one if it is one year before the introduction of weather derivative. 
Afterlaw (0) Dummy equal to one if it is the year during which weather derivative is introduced. 
Afterlaw(+1) Dummy equal to one if it is one year after the introduction of weather derivative. 
Afterlaw(>=2) Dummy equal to one if it is 2 or more years after the introduction of weather derivative. 
Treated 
Dummy equal to one if a firm has above median pre-event sensitivity of revenue to weather 
fluctuations. We estimate the sensitivity of revenue to weather conditions before 1997 using quarterly 
compustat data. Specifically, we estimate following specification: Rev/Assetit=αi+βi*EDD+γi*Firm 
Size+εt, where Rev/Asset is the quarterly revenue-to-assets ratio. EDD is the sum of Cooling Degree 
Days (CDD) and Heating Degree Days (HDD) aggregated at quarterly level at county where corporate 
headquarters are located. CDD is calculated as Max(0, ½*(Tmax+Tmin)-65) and HDD is Max(0, 65 -
1/2*(Tmax+Tmin)) . Tmax and Tmin are maximum and minimum daily temperature measured in 
Fahrenheit, respectively. 
Treated(StockRet) 
Dummy equal to one if a firm has above median average sensitivity of stock return to weather 
fluctuations during pre-event period (1992-1997). We estimate following regression by year for each 
stock-year that has at least 60 observations: Retit = β0,it + β1,it ∗ EDDit + γ′Factors + εt,Where Retit 
is daily stock returns, EDDit is the sum of CDD and HDD measured at the county where corporate 
headquarter is located and Factors are risk factors from Fama-French Model.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Weather Sensitivity 
  N Mean Std Median 25th Pctle 75th Pctle 
Beta-FF 899 0.75 0.86 0.49 0.22 0.96 
Risk-FF 899 7.37 6.85 5.35 2.57 9.99 
Beta-FFM 899 0.75 0.90 0.48 0.22 0.93 
Risk-FFM 899 7.34 7.02 5.26 2.39 10.17 
 
Panel B: CEO Incentive-Compensation Measures 
Panel B1: Our Sample 
 
Panel B2: Execucomp Ex Utilities 
  N Mean Std Median 25th  Pctle 75th  Pctle 
 
  N Mean Std Median 25th  Pctle 75th  Pctle 
Cash Comp 899 849.28 484.31 738.20 512.21 1033.60 
 
Cash Comp 13674 1148.99 1044.63 837.33 514.18 1385.70 
Equity Comp 899 592.60 1187.12 152.21 0.00 604.34 
 
Equity Comp 13748 2190.40 4340.58 669.22 72.49 2139.18 
Total Comp 899 1841.82 2318.41 1148.66 712.58 2025.74 
 
Total Comp 13748 4261.02 12162.88 1880.68 946.59 4132.77 
Equity Mix 899 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.00 0.37 
 
Equity Mix 13725 0.39 0.30 0.39 0.08 0.64 
Portfolio Delta 840 3.44 1.42 3.45 2.46 4.42 
 
Portfolio Delta 12713 5.37 1.56 5.32 4.38 6.33 
Portfolio Vega 868 2.27 1.86 2.61 0.00 3.80 
 
Portfolio Vega 13396 3.41 1.64 3.56 2.50 4.55 
 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
Panel C1: Our Sample 
 
Panel C2: Compustat Ex Utilities 
  N Mean Std Median 25th Pctle 75th  Pctle 
 
  N Mean Std Median 25th  Pctle 75th  Pctle 
CEO Tenure 899 6.43 3.78 6.00 4.00 8.00 
 
CEO Tenure 13817 8.32 6.91 7.00 4.00 10.00 
Total Assets 899 7543.32 8859.48 3865.97 1780.81 9688.06 
 
Total Assets 98770 1817.53 7249.15 104.33 18.92 548.04 
Firm Age 899 48.63 11.50 48.00 44.00 52.00 
 
Firm Age 99052 12.85 12.85 8.00 4.00 16.00 
Stock Return 899 0.10 0.27 0.09 -0.06 0.25 
 
Stock Return 68778 0.10 0.67 0.00 -0.30 0.33 
ROA 899 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 
 
ROA 89329 -0.18 0.81 0.01 -0.10 0.07 
Leverage 899 0.37 0.08 0.36 0.32 0.41 
 
Leverage 98254 0.10 0.48 0.09 -0.14 0.33 
Book-to-Market 899 0.67 0.24 0.62 0.53 0.75 
 
Book-to-Market 85201 0.55 1.25 0.51 0.24 0.89 
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Table 2 
Sensitivity of Equity Returns to Weather 
 
This Table presents the results of estimating the two-stage regressions given by Equations (1) and (2). The sample 
period is from 1993 to 2002. We use Hornstein and Greene’s (2012) method to account for the estimated (rather 
than observed) dependent variable in the second-stage. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are 
included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) level.  
 
  Fama French 3 Factor Model Carhart 4 Factor Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Beta-FF Risk-FF Beta-FFM Risk-FFM 
         
Afterlaw*Treated -0.16*** -1.64** -0.15** -1.49** 
 
(-2.64) (-2.56) (-2.46) (-2.41) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 -0.16 
 
(-0.32) (-0.21) (-0.48) (-0.37) 
Log Assets -0.01 0.16 -0.03 -0.13 
 
(-0.13) (0.21) (-0.41) (-0.16) 
Log Firm Age -1.10 -12.69 -1.00 -13.02 
 
(-1.17) (-1.17) (-1.05) (-1.20) 
Log Stock Return -0.08 -0.87 -0.10 -1.20 
 
(-0.73) (-0.60) (-0.86) (-0.82) 
ROA 0.17 -1.01 -0.04 -3.17 
 
(0.13) (-0.07) (-0.03) (-0.21) 
Leverage 0.09 0.23 0.07 0.09 
 
(0.28) (0.06) (0.20) (0.02) 
Book-to-Market 0.04 -0.26 0.08 0.20 
 
(0.31) (-0.14) (0.57) (0.11) 
     Observations 899 899 899 899 
R-squared 0.39 0.32 0.39 0.31 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3 
Change in Contract Design 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but 
unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Equity Comp Equity Mix 
         
Afterlaw*Treated -0.25*** -0.13*** -1.13*** -0.10*** 
 
(-3.02) (-2.67) (-3.04) (-3.82) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.06 0.07** -0.61** -0.06*** 
 
(1.21) (2.60) (-2.21) (-3.13) 
Log Assets 0.12 0.12 -0.12 -0.00 
 
(0.86) (1.40) (-0.20) (-0.08) 
Log Firm Age -2.14** -0.98** -7.58** -0.76** 
 
(-2.27) (-2.28) (-2.39) (-2.60) 
Log Stock Return 0.37** 0.21** 1.69*** 0.08* 
 
(2.47) (2.53) (3.25) (1.69) 
ROA 1.78 3.72*** 6.21 0.14 
 
(1.27) (5.31) (0.85) (0.25) 
Leverage 0.24 0.02 -0.69 0.07 
 
(0.49) (0.06) (-0.34) (0.39) 
Book-to-Market 0.03 -0.12 0.91 0.05 
 
(0.17) (-1.26) (1.09) (0.81) 
     
Observations 899 899 899 899 
R-squared 0.77 0.83 0.54 0.50 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4 
Change in Contract Incentives 
 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but 
unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega Unex/Total 
       
Afterlaw*Treated -0.28** -0.78*** 0.05* 
 
(-2.37) (-3.63) (1.70) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.37*** 0.03 -0.03 
 
(4.31) (0.25) (-1.38) 
Log Assets 0.54*** 0.51 -0.04 
 
(3.56) (1.45) (-1.01) 
Log Firm Age -6.29*** -3.74 0.37 
 
(-5.25) (-1.53) (0.98) 
Log Stock Return 0.31* 0.02 0.03 
 
(1.83) (0.09) (0.56) 
ROA 2.09 1.47 -0.23 
 
(1.11) (0.45) (-0.34) 
Leverage 0.38 -0.07 0.12 
 
(0.59) (-0.06) (0.81) 
Book-to-Market -1.12*** -0.40 -0.14* 
 
(-4.37) (-1.02) (-1.92) 
    
Observations 840 868 898 
R-squared 0.87 0.76 0.83 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5 
Parallel Trend 
 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the 
coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Total Comp Cash Comp Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega Unex/Total 
             
 Afterlaw (t=-1)*Treated 0.04 0.02 -0.27 -0.00 -0.14 0.07 0.02 
 
(0.49) (0.54) (-0.61) (-0.15) (-1.35) (0.50) (0.47) 
Afterlaw (t=0)*Treated 0.02 -0.01 -1.01** -0.03 0.03 -0.15 0.05 
 
(0.25) (-0.15) (-2.01) (-0.98) (0.21) (-0.72) (1.20) 
Afterlaw (t=1)*Treated -0.15 -0.02 -1.02* -0.06 -0.13 -0.25 0.03 
 
(-1.57) (-0.37) (-1.81) (-1.40) (-0.88) (-0.93) (0.45) 
Afterlaw (t>=2)*Treated -0.28*** -0.17*** -1.57*** -0.13*** -0.38** -1.01*** 0.08** 
 
(-2.62) (-2.72) (-3.43) (-3.98) (-2.30) (-3.71) (2.37) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.06 0.07** -0.62** -0.06*** 0.36*** 0.02 -0.03 
 
(1.16) (2.49) (-2.18) (-3.16) (4.24) (0.12) (-1.35) 
Log Assets 0.12 0.12 -0.11 -0.00 0.54*** 0.51 -0.04 
 
(0.85) (1.40) (-0.18) (-0.07) (3.56) (1.45) (-1.03) 
Log Firm Age -2.13** -0.93** -6.44** -0.71** -6.18*** -3.41 0.31 
 
(-2.21) (-2.12) (-2.04) (-2.33) (-5.14) (-1.45) (0.80) 
Log Stock Return 0.39** 0.23*** 1.74*** 0.09* 0.35** 0.12 0.02 
 
(2.49) (2.67) (3.25) (1.79) (1.99) (0.48) (0.44) 
ROA 1.76 3.72*** 7.01 0.17 2.11 1.53 -0.27 
 
(1.26) (5.38) (0.97) (0.30) (1.12) (0.48) (-0.40) 
Leverage 0.24 0.02 -0.67 0.07 0.38 -0.08 0.12 
 
(0.49) (0.07) (-0.33) (0.40) (0.59) (-0.07) (0.81) 
Book-to-Market 0.04 -0.11 0.95 0.06 -1.10*** -0.35 -0.14* 
 
(0.20) (-1.16) (1.13) (0.86) (-4.22) (-0.87) (-1.95) 
        
Observations 899 899 899 899 840 868 898 
R-squared 0.77 0.83 0.55 0.50 0.87 0.77 0.83 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6 
Changes in Business Cycles and Policies  
The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the 
coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) level. 
 
Panel A: Control for Local Business Conditions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Total Comp Cash Comp Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
             
Afterlaw*Treated -0.24** -0.11* -1.20** -0.13*** -0.31** -0.53* 
 
(-2.29) (-1.69) (-2.27) (-3.89) (-2.29) (-1.66) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.08 0.02 -1.17*** -0.11*** 0.11 -0.28 
 
(-0.88) (0.29) (-2.91) (-3.88) (1.00) (-1.34) 
Log Assets 0.17 0.12 0.33 0.02 0.56*** 0.46 
 
(0.80) (0.82) (0.46) (0.34) (2.83) (1.07) 
Log Firm Age 1.47 0.62 7.93 0.36 -7.60*** 5.36 
 
(0.56) (0.42) (1.10) (0.57) (-3.95) (0.94) 
Log Stock Return 0.42** 0.28** 1.14* 0.05 0.09 -0.21 
 
(2.12) (2.33) (1.65) (0.85) (0.35) (-0.56) 
ROA 2.40 3.75*** 6.73 0.52 2.84 1.21 
 
(1.31) (3.72) (0.76) (0.81) (1.07) (0.27) 
Leverage -0.25 -0.03 -4.61 -0.19 -0.26 -1.04 
 
(-0.39) (-0.08) (-1.63) (-0.84) (-0.37) (-0.97) 
Book-to-Market 0.12 0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -1.35*** -0.82 
 
(0.50) (0.32) (-0.07) (-0.14) (-3.62) (-1.44) 
       
Observations 899 899 899 899 840 868 
R-squared 0.86 0.89 0.75 0.74 0.94 0.88 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-Year Joint FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6 Cont’d 
Panel B: Control for Changes at State of Incorporation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Total Comp Cash Comp Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
             
Afterlaw*Treated -0.38*** -0.16** -1.87*** -0.14*** -0.41** -1.04*** 
 
(-3.08) (-2.40) (-2.67) (-3.15) (-2.59) (-3.16) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.13 -0.04 -1.57*** -0.14*** 0.04 -0.52** 
 
(-0.97) (-0.51) (-3.01) (-3.57) (0.25) (-2.22) 
Log Assets 0.01 -0.01 -0.16 0.03 0.65** 0.21 
 
(0.04) (-0.09) (-0.20) (0.46) (2.56) (0.64) 
Log Firm Age 2.45 1.28 15.64* 0.87 -6.23*** 8.98** 
 
(0.70) (0.66) (1.95) (1.12) (-2.64) (2.21) 
Log Stock Return 0.58** 0.45*** 1.50 0.04 0.21 0.43 
 
(2.17) (3.00) (1.61) (0.50) (0.73) (0.95) 
ROA 3.27 3.99** 5.56 0.30 1.45 3.41 
 
(1.32) (2.55) (0.52) (0.34) (0.46) (0.69) 
Leverage 0.08 0.22 -5.86 -0.19 -0.30 -0.28 
 
(0.09) (0.47) (-1.56) (-0.63) (-0.34) (-0.19) 
Book-to-Market 0.26 0.13 0.72 0.06 -1.18** -0.17 
 
(0.77) (0.71) (0.52) (0.55) (-2.23) (-0.31) 
       
Observations 899 899 899 899 840 868 
R-squared 0.90 0.93 0.83 0.81 0.96 0.93 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-Year Joint FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Incorporation-Year Joint FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7 
Alternative Event Window 
 
The sample period is from 1995 to 2000. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the 
coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) level. 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
             
Afterlaw*Treated -0.21** -0.08* -0.94** -0.08*** -0.14 -0.49** 
 
(-2.48) (-1.78) (-2.52) (-2.80) (-1.61) (-2.40) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.03 0.06 -0.78** -0.06** 0.44*** 0.04 
 
(0.44) (1.46) (-2.21) (-2.49) (4.20) (0.21) 
Log Assets 0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.49*** 0.33 
 
(0.40) (0.43) (-0.05) (0.34) (3.26) (0.85) 
Log Firm Age -1.45 -0.77 -8.48 -0.42 -6.23*** -5.65 
 
(-0.90) (-1.00) (-1.54) (-0.86) (-2.81) (-1.53) 
Log Stock Return 0.27 0.09 0.72 0.03 0.22 -0.27 
 
(1.34) (0.84) (1.24) (0.53) (1.30) (-0.86) 
ROA 1.63 3.87*** -2.48 -0.67 1.49 1.80 
 
(0.92) (3.90) (-0.35) (-1.20) (0.66) (0.46) 
Leverage 0.68 0.13 -2.96 -0.05 -0.40 -1.58 
 
(1.23) (0.44) (-1.34) (-0.24) (-0.55) (-1.23) 
Book-to-Market -0.09 -0.25** 0.05 -0.02 -1.27*** -0.39 
 
(-0.37) (-2.14) (0.05) (-0.25) (-4.96) (-1.14) 
       
Observations 569 569 569 569 531 549 
R-squared 0.79 0.86 0.62 0.56 0.89 0.78 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8 
CEO Preference 
 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the 
coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
             
Afterlaw*Treated -0.17** -0.08* -0.91** -0.08** -0.23* -0.60** 
 
(-2.11) (-1.68) (-2.07) (-2.53) (-1.73) (-2.54) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.04 -0.00 -0.46 -0.08** 0.29 0.03 
 
(-0.42) (-0.05) (-0.86) (-2.16) (1.60) (0.11) 
Log Assets 0.20 0.20** 0.42 0.05 0.53*** 0.72** 
 
(1.55) (2.59) (0.68) (1.05) (3.18) (1.98) 
Log Firm Age -2.10 -0.28 -8.79 -1.70*** -3.83** 1.06 
 
(-1.11) (-0.26) (-1.50) (-3.90) (-2.59) (0.33) 
Log Stock Return 0.29* 0.17** 1.42** 0.05 0.22 -0.19 
 
(1.86) (2.10) (2.54) (0.94) (1.45) (-0.76) 
ROA 2.29 4.01*** -1.38 -0.48 2.33 -1.46 
 
(1.57) (5.61) (-0.18) (-0.82) (1.26) (-0.43) 
Leverage 0.05 -0.10 -1.96 -0.01 0.52 0.58 
 
(0.09) (-0.32) (-0.93) (-0.03) (0.71) (0.45) 
Book-to-Market -0.11 -0.14 1.10 0.04 -1.12*** -0.67 
 
(-0.59) (-1.65) (1.31) (0.51) (-3.87) (-1.59) 
       
Observations 899 899 899 899 840 868 
R-squared 0.86 0.90 0.67 0.62 0.93 0.85 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9 Controlling for Possible Omitted Variables 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but 
unreported. t-statistics are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Total 
Comp 
Cash 
Comp 
Equity 
Comp 
Equity 
Mix 
Portfolio 
Delta 
Portfolio 
Vega 
             
Afterlaw*Treated -0.22*** -0.11*** -1.07*** -0.09*** -0.22* -0.59*** 
 
(-2.90) (-2.63) (-2.82) (-3.64) (-1.92) (-2.80) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.04 0.06** -0.67** -0.06*** 0.34*** 0.02 
 
(0.78) (2.17) (-2.36) (-3.35) (4.10) (0.19) 
Log Assets 0.08 0.08 -0.05 -0.00 0.48*** 0.41 
 
(0.58) (0.96) (-0.07) (-0.08) (2.75) (1.05) 
Log Firm Age -0.81 -0.22 -3.99 -0.52* -4.19*** -1.40 
 
(-0.96) (-0.44) (-1.12) (-1.70) (-2.83) (-0.44) 
Log Stock Return 0.26* 0.13 1.32*** 0.05 0.10 -0.17 
 
(1.69) (1.59) (2.61) (1.17) (0.64) (-0.72) 
ROA -2.42 2.00** -8.23 -1.04 -0.68 -4.36 
 
(-1.44) (2.17) (-0.92) (-1.44) (-0.28) (-1.09) 
Leverage 0.95* 0.13 2.12 0.22 1.14 1.77 
 
(1.73) (0.39) (0.82) (1.13) (1.35) (1.16) 
Book-to-Market 0.07 -0.11 0.93 0.06 -1.18*** -0.36 
 
(0.34) (-1.07) (1.21) (0.91) (-4.83) (-0.97) 
Inst Own 0.37** 0.19** 0.56 0.08 0.74*** 1.42*** 
 
(2.29) (2.04) (0.69) (1.33) (3.10) (2.97) 
Cash 2.18* 0.16 5.82 0.43 0.92 5.35* 
 
(1.95) (0.23) (1.06) (1.05) (0.69) (1.93) 
Zscore 0.50*** 0.21*** 1.85*** 0.13*** 0.58*** 0.77*** 
 
(4.76) (3.21) (3.79) (2.96) (4.74) (2.93) 
CAPEX 0.83 1.16** -5.52 -0.40 0.24 0.81 
 
(1.03) (2.45) (-1.35) (-1.28) (0.28) (0.39) 
Sales Growth -0.11* -0.02 -0.59 -0.06* -0.31*** -0.09 
 
(-1.77) (-0.47) (-1.53) (-1.88) (-3.19) (-0.56) 
PPE Growth 0.45*** 0.10 1.74** 0.17*** 0.22 0.48 
 
(3.01) (1.21) (2.50) (2.87) (1.38) (1.28) 
Dividend -6.47*** -4.89*** -18.02 -1.09 -18.44*** -11.65* 
 
(-2.64) (-3.61) (-1.46) (-1.31) (-4.97) (-1.74) 
       
Observations 892 892 892 892 833 861 
R-squared 0.79 0.84 0.56 0.52 0.88 0.78 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10 
Alternative Measure of Weather Exposure 
 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2002. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Intercepts are included but unreported. t-statistics are presented below the 
coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm and period (pre-1997/post-1997) level. 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
             
Afterlaw*Treated (StockRet) -0.23*** -0.08* -1.01*** -0.11*** -0.44*** -0.74*** 
 
(-2.76) (-1.71) (-2.83) (-4.43) (-3.77) (-3.34) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.07 0.08*** -0.57** -0.06*** 0.40*** 0.07 
 
(1.31) (2.79) (-2.05) (-2.96) (4.71) (0.57) 
Log Assets 0.11 0.10 -0.08 -0.01 0.54*** 0.42 
 
(0.72) (1.13) (-0.12) (-0.22) (3.65) (1.11) 
Log Firm Age -2.62*** -1.19*** -9.63*** -0.94*** -6.97*** -5.55** 
 
(-2.65) (-2.71) (-2.66) (-2.87) (-6.15) (-2.07) 
Log Stock Return 0.36** 0.20** 1.51*** 0.07 0.26 -0.09 
 
(2.22) (2.24) (2.81) (1.48) (1.47) (-0.33) 
ROA 1.53 3.64*** 2.71 -0.08 2.00 1.66 
 
(1.03) (5.05) (0.37) (-0.13) (1.08) (0.51) 
Leverage 0.04 -0.05 -1.82 -0.02 -0.08 -0.77 
 
(0.09) (-0.19) (-0.93) (-0.11) (-0.12) (-0.67) 
Book-to-Market -0.11 -0.16 0.05 -0.01 -1.33*** -0.74* 
 
(-0.54) (-1.60) (0.06) (-0.21) (-5.07) (-1.85) 
       
Observations 842 842 842 842 792 817 
R-squared 0.77 0.83 0.54 0.50 0.87 0.76 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Event-Time Difference-in-Differences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Log Total Comp Log Cash Comp Log Equity Comp Equity Mix Portfolio Delta Portfolio Vega 
             
Afterlaw (t=-1)*Treated (StockRet) 0.07 -0.01 -0.57 0.01 0.01 -0.11 
 
(0.88) (-0.27) (-1.28) (0.37) (0.10) (-0.78) 
Afterlaw (t=0)*Treated (StockRet) 0.09 0.02 -0.29 0.00 0.18 -0.23 
 
(1.21) (0.39) (-0.56) (0.02) (1.27) (-1.07) 
Afterlaw (t=1)*Treated (StockRet) -0.17* -0.05 -1.30** -0.07* -0.09 -0.39 
 
(-1.71) (-0.85) (-2.46) (-1.72) (-0.62) (-1.40) 
Afterlaw (t>=2)*Treated (StockRet) -0.20** -0.09 -1.15** -0.12*** -0.54*** -0.99*** 
 
(-2.02) (-1.54) (-2.56) (-3.90) (-3.44) (-3.54) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.07 0.08*** -0.58** -0.05*** 0.41*** 0.08 
 
(1.34) (2.82) (-2.05) (-2.91) (4.79) (0.59) 
Log Assets 0.11 0.10 -0.07 -0.01 0.52*** 0.40 
 
(0.71) (1.11) (-0.12) (-0.25) (3.53) (1.05) 
Log Firm Age -2.67*** -1.20*** -9.38** -0.95*** -7.14*** -5.54** 
 
(-2.72) (-2.72) (-2.53) (-2.81) (-6.43) (-2.09) 
Log Stock Return 0.36** 0.20** 1.51*** 0.07 0.29* -0.05 
 
(2.22) (2.25) (2.82) (1.54) (1.66) (-0.17) 
ROA 1.50 3.64*** 2.86 -0.08 1.94 1.62 
 
(1.01) (5.05) (0.39) (-0.13) (1.06) (0.50) 
Leverage 0.03 -0.06 -1.75 -0.03 -0.16 -0.89 
 
(0.07) (-0.22) (-0.90) (-0.18) (-0.27) (-0.81) 
Book-to-Market -0.10 -0.16 0.04 -0.01 -1.32*** -0.75* 
 
(-0.52) (-1.61) (0.04) (-0.21) (-5.18) (-1.90) 
       
Observations 842 842 842 842 792 817 
R-squared 0.77 0.83 0.54 0.50 0.87 0.76 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
